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In an expanding universe, time is on the side of the 
outcast. Those who once inhabited the suburbs of 
human contempt find that without changing their 
address they eventually live in the metropolis. 
— Quentin Crisp, The Naked Civil Servant
As the early days of the Internet become a distant 
memory it can now seem passé or naïve to speak 
of “the Internet revolution,” but it should not. 1 The 
art and activist movements that have arisen in the 
wake of the internet, have come closer than any of 
the avant-garde groups of the last two centuries to 
realizing the modernist utopian dream of universal 
collective participation in cultural production and the 
rise of a ‘mass intelligentsia,’ attaining what romantic 
modernists from Novalis to Joseph Beuys aspired to 
when they declared “every one an artist.”  
The proposition that electronic media could facilitate 
such a transformation of both culture and democracy 
precedes the net by several generations. As far back 
1932 Brecht’s lecture on the The Radio as an Appara-
tus of Communication, famously proposed a participa-
tory model in which he described radio as the “finest 
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In this essay I argue that despite the powerful forces seeking to domesti-
cate the internet, transforming it from the bio-diversity of a ‘creative com-
mons’ into a network of carefully managed ‘walled gardens,’ the drive to 
expand and intensify the ideal of democracy remains the ‘true north’ of the 
internet revolution. 
I further argue that an expansion of the ideal of democracy based 
on widening the circle of participation and collaborative expression is 
linked to the emergence of the ‘user’ as the lead player and primary agent 
for change replacing both the worker and the more static concept of the 
consumer. I suggest that the emergence of a ‘user language’ is best under-
stood through the theories developed by the cultural theorist de Certeau 
whose work became influential in the cultural studies milieu of the 1980s. 
I show how a decade later a media orientated interpretation of de Cer-
teau’s ideas inspired the ‘tactical media’ movement; a distinctive combina-
tion of art, technological experimentation, and political activism that arose 
in the early 1990s and successfully exploited the cracks already appearing 
in the edifice of traditional broadcast media as the internet began to take 
hold.
Finally I examine the possibility that unlike the failure of utopian ide-
als associated with 20th century broadcast media the equivalent ideals 
associated with the Internet are proving far more resilient. I conclude by 
suggesting reasons for the persistence of these emancipatory narratives 
and examine various experimental platforms suggesting that the utopian 
avant-garde perspective of the early Internet, though continually under 
threat, remains a potent force whose energies are far from exhausted.     
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in more labile, and poetic terms that suggest a distinc-
tive style in which the weak are seeking to turn the 
tables on the strong.
Tactics must depend on:
clever tricks, knowing how to get away with things, 
‘hunter’s cunning,’ maneuvers, polymorphic simula-
tions, joyful discoveries poetic as well as warlike 
they go back to the immemorial [...] intelligence 
displayed in the tricks and imitations of plants and 
fishes. From the depths of the ocean to the streets 
of the modern megalopolises, there is a continuity 
and permanence of these tactics. 9
When de Certeau began to write of tactics in the late 
1970s he was describing a largely speculative and 
barely visible twilight realm. Invisibility and subterfuge 
was part of the point, to a degree he was making a 
virtue out of a necessity. As he put it:
The “making” in question is a production, a poesis’ –
but a hidden one, because it is scattered over areas 
defined and occupied by systems of “production” 
(television, urban development, commerce, etc)... 
...it is dispersed, but it insinuates itself everywhere, 
silently and almost invisibly, because it does not 
manifest itself through its own products, but rather 
through its ways of using the products imposed by 
a dominant economic order.  10
From InvIsIble TacTIcs To TacTIcal medIa
Although de Certeau’s ideas became influential among 
cultural studies theorists of the 1980s it was not until 
the early 1990’s that mass access to cheap and easy 
to use media put these powerful expressive tools in 
the hands of users. It was this fact that propelled de 
Certeau’s twilight world of barely visible tactics into 
the light of day. With visibility came the reflexivity that 
enabled a new and increasingly self-conscious form of 
cultural practice to emerge. A constellation of distinc-
tive but overlapping practices: artists, hackers, political 
activists, independent media makers coalesced into a 
previously un-named movement which a network of 
artists and activists associated with the Amsterdam 
based festival The Next 5 Minutes, dubbed tactical 
media. 11 The name stuck and (for better and for 
worse) the ‘brand’ stubbornly persists. 
Tactical media gave a temporary home to a growing 
number of artists who whilst repudiating the poli-
tics of the contemporary ‘art world’ were unwilling 
to relinquish the utopian legacy of the avant-garde 
which (in contrast to the disciplinary regimes of party 
politics) placed a high value on the liberating power of 
expression in politics. This ‘Expressivism’ can be traced 
back to the eighteenth century Romantic rebellion 
against the rationalist utilitarianism of the Enlighten-
ment and was the first major social movement in 
which artists played a central role. In part this was be-
cause of the inspiration drawn from the movement’s 
founding philosophers particularly Herder and Novalis 
whose writings gave a new significance to the power 
of language (or expression), proposing that “in a world 
of contingent horizons, our sense of meaning depends, 
critically, on our powers of expression…” and “that dis-
covering a framework of meaning is interwoven with 
invention.” 12 The centrality of the expressive dimen-
sion in Romanticism accounts for the important role 
played by artists, but with the important caveat that 
the spiritual freedoms and possibilities of self-creation 
enjoyed by artists were also the rightful legacy of all 
human subjects. Connecting these deeply rooted his-
torical aspirations of universal expressive participation 
to new media is a key factor in understanding how the 
ideal of democracy has been transformed ever since 
its fate became linked to the internet.
possible communication apparatus in public life, a vast 
network of pipes. That is to say, it would be if it knew 
how to receive as well as to transmit, how to let the 
listener speak as well as hear, how to bring him into a 
relationship instead of isolating him.” 2
Although this drive for mass participation has been at 
the core of utopian avant-garde art for generations 
it was generally believed that this possibility of mass 
dis-alienation existed only as potential, a potential that 
the masses simply did not have the power to actualize. 
However an alternative view emerged with the pub-
lication in 1980 of The Practice of Everyday Life, in 
which the Jesuit Scholar Michel de Certeau proposed 
that an invisible world of mass cultural participation 
far from being a distant utopia already existed albeit 
surreptitiously in a twilight realm of what he called 
“the tactical.” 
Although computer technology was not a primary 
concern to de Certeau, it was he who substituted the 
term “user” for the less active “consumer” describ-
ing the purpose his work as bringing to light  “... the 
models of action characteristic of users whose status 
as the dominated element in society (a status that 
does not mean they are either passive or docile) is 
concealed by the euphemistic term ‘consumers.’” 3 
This substitution was influential in creating an alterna-
tive to academic cultural studies based on the politics 
of representation shifting the emphasis towards a 
more active practice orientated ‘user language.’ This 
prescient emphasis on user participation contributed 
to the emergence of a new perspective in which the 
consumer was recognized as equally important as the 
worker and in which the key power relations were 
analyzed in terms of the dichotomy he introduced be-
tween strategies and tactics. 
The User langUage oF every day lIFe
“Every day life invents itself by poaching in countless 
ways on the property of others.” 4 So wrote de Cer-
teau in The Practice of Everyday Life,” a book which 
arrived at a much richer and more supple picture of 
the realities of cultural politics than were available as 
the staple diet of the Cultural Studies movement of 
the period. In place of an identity politics based on 
critiques of media representations, de Certeau intro-
duced a less deterministic emphasis on the uses to 
which audiences put media representations, the mul-
tiple ways in which these forms are tactically appropri-
ated and repurposed by consumers. 
For de Certeau cultural production could only be fully 
understood as multiple acts of co-creation in which 
the consumer was never passive recipient but rather 
an active though unequal, participant in the creation 
of meaning. Above all he saw the act of consumption 
as a form of production. “To a rationalized, expansion-
ist and at the same time centralized, clamorous, and 
spectacular production corresponds another produc-
tion, called “consumption.” 5 de Certeau provide a 
language appropriate to profound changes in social, 
economic, and power relations taking place “where 
the figure of the consumer takes center stage along-
side (or even instead of) the worker, or better where 
these two figures are merged. Hardt and Negri thus 
speak of “affective labor.” 6
At the core of The Practice of Every Day Life is the 
distinction between tactics and strategies. Although 
consumers are full participants in the creation of 
meaning it is nevertheless a highly unequal relation-
ship. He defines strategy “as a calculus of force 
relationships when a subject of will and power (a 
proprietor, an enterprise, a city, a scientific institution) 
can be isolated from an ‘environment.’” 7 …a place 
where it can “capitalize on its advantages, prepare its 
expansions, and secure independence with respect to 
circumstances.” 8 In contrast he describes the tactical 
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In an essay written in 2006 I described how in the 
early phase of tactical media. The power some of us 
attributed to this new ‘media politics’ appeared to be 
borne out by the role that all forms of media seemed 
to have played in the collapse of the Soviet Empire. At 
the time it seemed as though old style armed insur-
rection had been superseded by digital dissent and 
media revolutions. It was as if the Samizdat spirit, 
extended and intensified by the proliferation of Do-it-
yourself media, had rendered the centralized statist 
tyrannies of the Soviet Union untenable. Some of us 
allowed ourselves to believe that it would only be a 
matter of time before the same forces would chal-
lenge our own tired and tarnished oligarchies.
As late as 1999 in his Reith lecture, Anthony Giddens 
could still confidently assert that “[t]he information 
monopoly, upon which the Soviet system was based, 
had no future in an intrinsically open framework of 
global communications.” 13 Since then it is not only 
the advent of the Chinese firewall that might make 
him less certain of his case, it is also that the corpo-
rations which effectively mediate the access to the 
internet (Google and FaceBook) have themselves ex-
hibited monopolistic tendencies. 
The principal point I was making in 2006 when the 
social media were still embryonic, was to plea for this 
generation of media activists to relinquish the cult 
of ‘ephemerality’ – one of the shibboleths of both 
contemporary art and tactical media. I argued that the 
time had come to replace hit and run guerrilla activism 
with “longer-term commitments and deeper engage-
ments with the people and organisations networked 
around contested issues.” 
Subsequent manifestations of the spirit of Tactical 
Media have indeed succeeded in both consolidating 
their platforms and scaling up their ambitions. Large 
scale platforms such as Indymedia, WikiLeaks, Moveon.
org and Avaaz have in a various ways succeeded in 
challenging the status quo and leveraging world public 
opinion in ways unimagined by previous generations 
and transcending the culture of small scale homeo-
pathic interventions that were the signature of the 
early period of tactical media. 
recUperaTIng The UTopIan momenT
Tactical Media had succeeded in re-igniting the im-
pulse behind successive generations of avant-garde 
utopian art movements in which the role of artists was 
envisioned as being to liberate a potential for art mak-
ing (or the creative principal) in everyone. A potential 
whose field was aesthetic but whose horizon was 
political. 14
And perhaps most surprising of all, in the second 
decade of the new millennium it is this most radical 
interpretation of the cyber-prophets which has suc-
ceeded in capturing, under the general rubric of, ‘user 
generated content,’ mainstream public enthusiasm 
and even commercial success. Clay Shirkey is not 
untypical of the many scholarly cheer leaders (includ-
ing Manuel Castells, Yochai Benklar) when he claims 
that we are witnessing “the greatest enhancement of 
communicative expression since the invention of the 
printing press.” 15
In stark contrast to these euphoric narratives how-
ever we see an increasing number of skeptical voices 
emerging. Commentators such as Evgeny Morozov 
have suggested that those of us attributing revolu-
tionary potential to these media are living through 
a ‘net delusion.’ An even more cogent critic is media 
theorist Jodie Dean, who has characterized the narra-
tives of tactical media as “communicative capitalism’s 
perfect lure ‘in which’ subjects feel themselves to be 
active, even as their every action reinforces the status 
quo. Revelation can be allowed even celebrated and 
furthered because its results remain ineffectual.” 16 
Providing these critiques with an important histori-
cal perspective is the book The Master Switch: The 
Rise and Fall of Information Empires, by scholar and 
policy advocate, Tim Wu, in which he described what 
he called the “long cycle” a process whereby open 
information systems become consolidated and closed 
over time. In this process whenever a new and radical 
media technology arises (print, film, radio, television, 
internet) it is inevitably accompanied by utopian vi-
sions of social and political transformation (as we saw 
with Brecht and radio) only to move inexorably to a 
closed and controlled industry, “a typical progression 
from somebody’s hobby to somebody’s industry to 
somebody’s empire.” 17 
new rUles oF engagemenT
It is possible to imagine that de Certeau would have 
been initially gratified by the degree to which the tac-
tical ‘user’ he championed has emerged as the ‘prime 
mover’ of the web 2.0 era. He would however have 
noted that not only is his dichotomy between the 
tactical and the strategic positions still intact, it also 
continues to be accompanied by the asymmetrical 
balance of power. Closer analysis would however have 
revealed that the Internet’s distributed architecture 
means that the rules of engagement have changed, 
creating new spaces for both user agency and their 
control in equal measure. 
Unlike the settled domesticated parklands of the 
broadcast media world, the Internet has been com-
pared to the raucous bio-diversity of a rainforest. This 
can sometimes lead to suggestions of chaos or lack 
of structure, and have lead to metaphors suggest-
ing a landscape that is ‘out of control.’ But nothing 
could be further from the truth. The Internet works 
because of not despite structure. Like any language, 
its technological grammar simultaneously constrains 
and enables. Media theorist, Alex Galloway has named 
this enabling and constraining structure of the inter-
net a Protocol, in his illuminating book of the same 
name. Eschewing narratives of ‘the virtual’ Galloway’s 
staunchly materialist description demonstrates how 
the Internet’s historically unique features are founded 
on a set of technical and behavioral arrangements: 
“Standards governing the implementation of specific 
technologies. Like their diplomatic predecessors, com-
puter protocols establish specific points necessary to 
enact an agreed upon standard of action.” 18
Adding a new layer of technical understanding and 
analysis to Manuel Castells’s concept of the “network 
society,” Galloway distinguishes different kinds of net-
work identifying the specific form of the “distributed 
network” as the basis for ‘the protocol’ behind the 
Internet. According to Galloway, “[b]y design protocols 
such as Internet protocols cannot be centralized.” 19 
In part III of Protocol, Galloway proposes what he 
calls “Protocol Futures” resistance not to reject the 
technologies but to “direct these protocological tech-
nologies, whose distributed structure is empowering 
indeed, toward what Hans Magnus Enzensberger calls 
an “emancipated media” created by active social ac-
tors rather than passive users.” 20
Those who control the infrastructure and configure 
the protocols of the social web may preach open 
standards but they are in reality far from transparent. 
Drawing on the work of media scholar Felix Stalder, 
we could locate the tactical and the strategic domains 
of the web.2.0 era in what Stalder calls the front-end 
and the back-end. The front-end where the actions 
may be “decentralized, ad-hoc, cheap, easy-to-use, 
community-oriented, and transparent” and the back-
end, which are “centralized, based on long-term plan-
ning, very expensive, difficult-to-run, corporate, and 
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opaque. If the personal blog symbolizes one side, the 
data-center represents the other.” “…there is a grow-
ing tension between the dynamics on the front-end 
(where users interact) and on the back-end (to which 
the owners have access).” 21
An example of how the contradictions between back 
end and front end are playing out in practice could 
be observed in a skirmish, which took place during 
the media coverage of the London Olympics. In this 
incident the Los Angeles based journalist Guy Adams, 
reporting for the Independent, an important UK na-
tional daily, tweeted about the poor coverage given 
to the opening ceremony by NBC. Adams concluded 
his tweet by transmitting the corporate address of 
the boss of NBC urging people to send tweets and 
e-mails. Twitter immediately suspended his account. It 
later emerged that Twitter had alerted NBC in order 
to trigger a complaint and so legitimize the suspen-
sion. Behind this apparently trivial conflict was the fact 
that Twitter and NBC had established a commercial 
partnership to transmit the Olympics. It was the first 
content partnership Twitter had ever established with 
a broadcaster of this size. The kinds of tensions on 
display are clear enough, the avowed commitment of 
Twitter to being an open platform committed to free 
speech trumped by the need to keep an important 
commercial partner happy. The immediate conse-
quence of the suspended account was an uprising 
from the Twitter user community with hash tag, “NBC 
fail” or “fail NBC.” As a result three weeks later the 
account was reinstated along with an apology in a 
Twitter blog post saying “we apologize we did alert 
NBC official and that was wrong.” The same kind of 
tensions between stated ideology and the realities of 
strategic power relationships could be seen on a much 
larger stage when state power is threatened by the 
new power of apparently weaker players.  
At the beginning of 2010 Hilary Clinton gave a speech 
lauding the internet revolution along with the role of 
the web 2.0 platforms in the uprisings in the Middle 
East, in terms that would have been recognized by 
both the father of media theory Marshal McLuhan as 
well as later tactical media theorists, when she de-
scribed the net not only as “the nervous system of the 
planet” but also as the “samizdat of our day.”
If nothing else, her direct appeals to global public 
opinion demonstrated the degree to which the Inter-
net has transformed mainstream ideas about what 
constitutes a modern democracy. However, the con-
tradictions at the heart of the current landscape were 
revealed within a matter of months when Clinton was 
to be found addressing a hastily convened state de-
partment press conference to condemn the WikiLeaks 
Iraqi exposé as “not just an attack on America’s for-
eign policy interests it was an attack on the interna-
tional community.” Clearly the “Samizdat” culture she 
had been celebrating just a few months earlier was to 
be celebrated until it impinged upon American power.  
people don’T wanT masTers
In a much quoted piece of research carried out in 
2003 the renowned sociologist of networks Manuel 
Castells identified an example of how behavior and 
attitudes of Catalonian computer users were being 
mirrored in behavior away from computers: 
The more an individual has a project of autonomy 
(personal, professional, socio/political, communica-
tive) the more she uses the Internet. And in a time 
space sequence the more he/she uses the Internet, 
the more autonomous she becomes vis-à-vis soci-
etal rules and institutions. 22
Increasingly this horizontal networking and increased 
autonomy also expresses itself as a deepening distrust 
of traditional models of governance and leadership. 
One of the primary observable characteristics of the 
new social movements such as Occupy, is that they 
are largely movements without leaders. It would be 
inconceivable for any of them to say, as the British 
Labour party said on winning the election in 1945 “we 
are the masters now.” “It just happens that people 
don’t want more masters. And that is both very com-
plicated but is very interesting.” (Manuel Castells in 
conversation with journalist Paul Mason at the LSE.) 23
In 2012 at a public discussion Paul Mason touched the 
nub of the issue when he put the following partly rhe-
torical question to Castells: “Mandela did, Martin Lu-
ther King did [working with] hierarchical movements, 
working with a goal, a program and a leadership. Why 
do we worship the spontaneity of the network pro-
test?” “Because” replies Castells “people don’t trust 
leaders anymore..” “It took 20-30 years from the ar-
rival of mass industrialization to the point when the 
union power and the labor movement became part of 
political institutions […]” “It is a long journey from the 
minds of people to the institutions of society.” Castells 
is arguing that the transformation he believes to be 
underway is occurring “not through organized politics 
in the same way. Because networks are different, net-
works don’t need hierarchical organizations.” 24
People may not want masters or hierarchies but for 
now the established concentrations of wealth and 
power remain impervious to change. For those whom 
the ‘true north’ of the internet revolution remains the 
pursuit of expanded forms of democracy, this lack of 
progress leads us to continuously return to the same 
question: how do we organize democratic governance 
differently in a digital age? There is no teleogical guar-
antee of progressive outcomes. Neither will progress 
be the outcome of neatly implemented strategies. 
It will be hit and miss, trial and error. Install, update, 
crash, restart, de-install, a digital version of Becket’s 
dictum “Fail, fail again, fail better.” 
The neo-pragmaTIsTs and TheIr dIsconTenTs
In order to bring about radical change in the world 
you don’t need to be controversial. You can stand 
squarely with the vast majority of people and still 
have a revolutionary agenda for change. 
— Ricken Patel, Co-founder and Director of 
Avaaz (interview 2008 BBC World - Hard Talk)
Communication tools don’t get socially interesting 
until they get technologically boring. 
— Clay Shirkey, Here Comes Everybody
So where are the organizational experiments, the trial 
and error stories?
In an ambitious extended essay, Digital Solidarity, Felix 
Stalder has recently set out to link the newly emerg-
ing forms of agency and subjectivity associated with 
the digital realm to the collective arrival of major new 
forms of solidarity. He goes on to draw up what he 
calls “an inventory of forms, reduced to four basic 
types: commons, assemblies, swarms and weak net-
works.” 25
Alongside this inventory I would add the well es-
tablished genre of the ‘succès de scandale’ such as 
WikiLeaks and Anonymous, a genre whose stock in 
trade is ‘provocation.’ This is a well established ritual 
that has been the signature tune of modernism since 
the riot that attended the premier of Stravinsky’s Rite 
of Spring guaranteed subsequent packed houses. Ever 
since to be radical has become indistinguishable from 
being controversial. We also see how the disruptive 
impact that the internet has wrought on the retail 
1 0 1 1
L E O N A R D O E L E C T R O N I C A L M A N A C  V O L  1 9  N O  4 I S S N  1 0 7 1 - 4 3 9 1       I S B N  9 7 8 - 1 - 9 0 6 8 9 7 - 2 6 - 0 I S S N  1 0 7 1 - 4 3 9 1       I S B N  9 7 8 - 1 - 9 0 6 8 9 7 - 2 6 - 0 V O L  1 9  N O  4  L E O N A R D O E L E C T R O N I C A L M A N A C
A R T I C L EA R T I C L E
sector is now beginning to be felt in the mainstream 
political sphere as insurgents and upstarts such as the 
Italian maverick anti-politician Beppe Grillo’s Five Star 
Movement (M5S) has undercut the Italian political 
establishment by deploying the web (initially through 
his blog which effectively bypassed Berlusconi’s domi-
nation of traditional broadcast media) to aggregate 
opinion and votes without recourse to a conventional 
party political structures. 
At the other end of the spectrum we have what I 
argue are best described as the ‘Neo-pragmatists’ of 
the web. This is a tendency, which began in 1998 with 
the launch of MoveOn.org. This project was founded 
by two successful silicon valley entrepreneurs, Joan 
Blades and Wes Boyd, who after selling their software 
company, Berkeley Systems for a close to $14 million, 
went on to found the web based campaigning and ad-
vocacy network MoveOn.org. MoveOn developed the 
techniques later adopted and adapted by numerous 
imitators that represent a key development in nature 
of how to do political activism and enact democracy 
through the Internet. 
By successfully mobilizing millions of users around 
issues rather than party affiliations or affinity groups, 
MoveOn and their ilk highlight the way in which it is 
the objects of politics (the issues) that call the sub-
jects of politics (the public) into being. 
Knowingly or unknowingly this approach reflects and 
extends some of the key conclusions the American 
Pragmatist philosopher, John Dewey drew from his 
extended published dialogue with Walter Lipmann in 
the 1920s. The Dutch theorist, Noortje Maares has 
written extensively and illuminatingly on how con-
cepts drawn from the Dewey - Lipmann debates can 
help us to re-think the nature and role of the public in 
the democracies of the internet age. Maares describes 
Dewey as arguing that you “cannot separate out the 
content, the issues from the subjects …the only way a 
public gets pulled into politics, is through content. The 
indirect consequences of action that people are af-
fected by, is what calls a public into being.” 26
This is a position that flies in the face of those who be-
lieve that to give weight to issues is to instrumentalize 
the political passions at the heart of democracy. But 
for Dewey it was absurd “to assume that the politi-
cal passions that are so revered by democrats can be 
isolated from the issues at stake in politics…. Political 
passions, Dewey argued, are evoked by virtue of being 
implicated in an issue…” 27
From the outset MoveOn reflected these principles. 
It began as a single-issue electronic mailing list based 
on outrage at the paralysis of American politics due 
to the Monica Lewinski scandal. It began as simply 
passing around an e-mail petition to “censure Presi-
dent Clinton and ‘move on’” as an alternative to the 
impeachment. As they refined and developed their 
methods MoveOn evolved into an ongoing political 
experiment campaigning on a range of issues from 
policy on Iraq through to FaceBook’s approach to user 
privacy. The key to MoveOn’s success and continuing 
influence has been its capacity to use crowd sourcing 
to raise millions of dollars to support its campaigns. 
Their capacity to use the web to aggregate mass 
public opinion through petitions, polls and fund raising 
combined with more traditional forms of grass roots 
organizing has implications that shift the emphasis of 
politics from party politics to moving particular issues 
forward. 
The background of Blade and Boyd brought a par-
ticular set of technical and organizational attitudes 
to the table, which helped to define the character 
of this movement. Their experience as new media 
developers with a strong business background meant 
that from the outset their activism was founded on a 
pragmatic understanding of the dynamics required for 
this technology to engage with and broaden the circle 
of participants. 
This professionalization or (as some would claim) 
corporatization of activism has spawned numerous 
imitators including 38Degrees and Change.org and 
most significantly, the MoveOn spin off Avaaz, which 
means ‘voice’ in a number of languages, founded in 
2007. Avaaz began with the ambition of taking the 
philosophy and web savvy formulas pioneered by 
MoveOn to develop an international constituency to 
address global issues. 
At the time of writing Avaaz has passed the threshold 
of 20 million members, making it the world’s largest 
activist network, giving it a global reach and scale that 
has taken the concept of web-based activism to the 
next level. However the decision to situate Avaaz on 
the international stage is not only a question of scale, 
it also follows extends an important aspect of neo-
pragmatist logic which is that appealing to a global 
constituency aspires to short circuit the power games 
that bedevil national politics. 
The key characteristic of all of these groups is the low 
threshold of commitment required for membership. 
This policy was present at the outset at 1998 with 
MoveOn where to be a ‘member’ requires no subscrip-
tion, in fact nothing other than a single action, which 
could be as little as signing an on-line petition or join-
ing a forum discussion. It is this ease of entry that is in 
part responsible for enabling these organizations to 
accumulate such vast memberships. Their critics point 
to this fact as being their greatest weakness. But on 
the contrary it is their understanding of how the web 
enables the aggregation of millions of small contribu-
tions into large effects that represents their greatest 
innovation. In an interview with BBC’s ‘Hardtalk’ just a 
year after it was founded, Avaaz’s co-founder and di-
rector Ricken Patel described his core demographic as 
“the Mum with not a lot of time to spare [who] appre-
ciates a service where she can use the small amount 
of money or time that she has to give…” 28 When 
challenged on the blandness of his corporate image 
Patel is unapologetic and made what I would argue is 
the core claim of the neo-pragmatists of the web, “In 
order to bring about radical change in the world you 
don’t need to be controversial. You can stand squarely 
with the vast majority of people and still have a 
revolutionary agenda for change.” 29 This statement 
captures the essence of this era’s transformation 
from the heroic pioneering days of the net when only 
radicals and geeks participated to the era of the social 
web. As Clay Shirkey put it in his aptly named book, 
Here Comes Everybody: “Communication tools don’t 
get socially interesting until they get technologically 
boring.” 30
It is precisely this ease of participation that radical 
commentators find so problematic. Traditionally the 
essence of radical politics has been personal sacri-
fice, solidarity and above all, commitment. For those 
who take their politics seriously the web pragmatists 
represent the junk food of politics, to be dismissed as 
“Slacktivism” the “Clicktivists” or as Žižek dubbed the 
process, “interpassivity.” 
As a result they have become a fashionable target of 
radical critics and artists such as Les Liens Invisibles 
who have generated a number of high profile works 
parodying these platforms, which they characterise as 
armchair activism. In one such work they developed 
an online petition service 31Repetitionr, commissioned 
by the Arnolfini Gallery, Bristol. They developed an 
app to ‘broaden your armchair activism horizons’ to 
which they added the slogan ‘Tweet for Action, Aug-
ment your Reaction’ encouraging people to create 
their ‘own insurrection’ using the communications and 
image strategies of an advertising campaign. Parody-
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ing what they believe to be the “illusion that corporate 
social networks can capture the democratic spirit that 
characterized the utopias of the early phase of the 
Internet.” 31
Witty, thought provoking as these projects are it is in 
fact the artists and the critical commentariat who are 
the real conservatives, clinging to their avant-garde 
rituals and tribal affiliations every bit as much as the 
mainstream Italian political parties who were put on 
the back foot by Beppe Grillo’s M5S. If the disrup-
tive technologies of the Internet have transformed 
every other sector from commerce to journalism 
why should avant-garde radical art and politics be the 
exception? Far from representing a philosophical con-
tradiction the corporate look and feel of these groups 
is wholly consistent with the neo-pragmatist creed In 
order to bring about radical change in the world you 
don’t need to be controversial. 32
At the beginning of 2013 Avaaz continued their com-
mitment to re-imaging democracy in ways that Dewey 
might recognize through the enactment of their an-
nual consultation process, a large-scale experiment 
in democratic consultation. It combined a detailed 
polling exercise involving millions of its members, in 
14 languages and in excess of a hundred countries, 
combined with intense online discussions covering 
numerous issues. The poll and accompanying on-line 
discussions covered questions of detail involving the 
identification of which specific campaigns to support. 
But it also looked at meta questions relating to the 
governance of Avaaz. For example it looked at how 
the permanent staff should respond to the results of 
the poll itself, asking whether it should be seen as a 
guide or a binding mandate. A large majority came 
out in favor of using the data as a guide rather than a 
binding mandate. The fact that the organization is en-
tirely financed by contributions from members leads 
Avaaz to claim that its members are the bosses and it 
has compared the role of Patel and his staff as that of 
the president or prime minister being briefed by in-
formed civil servants. The question of how campaigns 
are selected and promoted is part of the key issue of 
governance and the balance between how nudges 
from the Avaaz staff in one direction or another is 
tricky and can all to easily lead to charges of bias. 
As with Grillo and web guru Casaleggio’s role with 
M5S, and Assange’s role with WikiLeaks, Patel’s char-
ismatic presence with Avaaz is far from unproblem-
atic, particularly where Avaaz appeared to be making 
excessive claims for its role in helping journalists to 
escape from Syria in 2012. Patel has recently put this 
error down to the fog of war. But mistakes are the 
inevitable price of genuine engagement and should 
not lead to the default position of knowing cynicism. 
All of these groups including Avaaz have had the vision 
to step out of the established conception of how to 
do democratic politics and into the new hybrid spaces 
that combine the virtual and the street, which inevi-
tably entails risk and contradiction. It is only from this 
actual practice including a willingness to fail and fail 
again that the vital renewal of democratic politics im-
manent to the age of networks will emerge. ■
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